Evolutionary game theory

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Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is the application of population genetics-inspired models of change in gene frequency in populations to game theory. It differs from classical game theory by focusing on the dynamics of strategy change more than the properties of strategy equilibria. Despite its name, evolutionary game theory is practised more by economists than biologists.

The common methodology to study the evolutionary dynamics in games is through replicator equations. Continuous replicator equations assume infinite populations, continuous time, complete mixing and that strategies breed true. The attractors (stable fixed points) of the equations are equivalent with evolutionarily stable states.

See also

References

  • Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games.
  • P. Hammerstein and R. Selten, "Game theory and evolutionary biology", in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Eds. (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 929-993
  • Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998) Evolutionary games and population dynamics, Cambridge University Press
  • Taylor, P. D. (1979). Evolutionarily Stable Strategies with Two Types of Players J. Appl. Prob. 16, 76-83.
  • Taylor, P. D., and Jonker, L. B. (1978). Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics Math. Biosci. 40, 145-156.
  • Weibull, J. W. (1995) Evolutionary game theory, MIT Press

External links

Template:Game theoryTemplate:Gametheory-stub

de:Evolutionäre Spieltheorieit:Teoria dei giochi (evoluzione)


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